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Whistleblowing as a new regulatory instrument in
global governance: the case of tax evasion
Tony Porter
McMaster University
Karsten Ronit
University of Copenhagen
Abstract The cross-border impacts of whistleblowing recently have become far more
visible and consequential, as evident with the ‘Paradise’ and ‘Panama Papers’ leaks,
which exposed tax and other financial wrongdoings of prominent personalities around
the world, leading to scandals, resignations and prosecutions. Despite its new
prominence, whistleblowing often continues to be seen as a series of ad hoc chance acts.
We argue instead that whistleblowing is an increasingly institutionalized regulatory
tool that is enabled by an emergent ‘whistleblowing system’, with similarities to other
new forms of informal global governance. Whistleblowing can be controversial, and we
develop a framework for assessing whether any particular whistleblowing event and the
system that enables it are in the public interest. We then apply this analysis to the case
of global tax evasion. We conclude that a whistleblowing system can make important
contributions to difficult cross-border regulatory challenges such as tax evasion,
especially where other governance systems fail.
Introduction
The leaks of the ‘Paradise Papers’ and the ‘Panama Papers’ have dramatic-
ally highlighted the global importance of whistleblowing in the governance
of taxation. An article in Wired noted that the Panama Papers were ‘the big-
gest leak in whistleblower history’, estimated to be 2.6 terabytes, a thousand
times larger than WikiLeaks’ 2010 1.73 gigabytes, compared with the 1971
Pentagon Papers equivalent to less than 100 megabytes (Greenberg 2016). A
co-founder of the Occupy movement referred to this as ‘leaktivism’s coming
of age’ (White 2016). The Paradise Papers are the second largest leak at 1.4
terabytes.1 These leaks were not only large but impactful, embarrassing
world leaders and celebrities, and quickly leading to the resignation of min-
isters, reorganization of public administrations and pressures on banks
involved in the scandals.
1 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41880153>.
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This paper aims to contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the
significance of whistleblowing in a global context. First, it will look at whistle-
blowing as an institutionalized global regulatory tool that works within an
emerging ‘whistleblowing system’ and whose presence and properties have
not yet been adequately analysed. Nascent whistleblowing systems exem-
plify important changes in the institutional characteristics of global govern-
ance that are hard to capture through existing theories. Second, a
framework will be developed to address the questions about whether and
when whistleblowing is in the public interest, provoked by the unconven-
tional, unpredictable and often disruptive character of whistleblowing.
Conceptual modifications to existing nationally focused approaches to whis-
tleblowing that are called for when discussing whistleblowing and global
governance will be highlighted.
The second part of the paper applies the outlined approach to whistle-
blowing systems as a regulatory instrument to global taxation, and dis-
cusses the potential of the unfolding whistleblowing systems to address
particularly challenging global policy problems involving secrecy, such as
tax evasion. Tackling the cross-border aspects of tax evasion has become a
priority of policymakers in recent years, evident for instance in the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS) of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States (US) Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the European Union’s EU’s
Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation. However,
detecting tax evasion remains challenging. The ensuing discussion thus
analyses how whistleblowing has evolved to combat cross-border tax eva-
sion and for what types of global policy problems this new regulatory
instrument may be most suited. In spite of the increased visibility of the
role played by whistleblowing, especially with the Panama and Paradise
Papers, and of its impact in contributing to punishment for wrongdoing, the
potentials and limitations of whistleblowing as a regulatory instrument for
addressing taxation issues have not yet been adequately considered in a
global context. Therefore, an important contribution of the paper is to high-
light the building of new institutions operating across jurisdictional bounda-
ries with the explicit goal to set new agendas, to influence policy and to
trigger punishments, at the domestic and international level. In this process,
the institutions should not be studied in isolation but in their combined
effort. Based on different and sometimes overlapping incentives, they are
concerned with carving out specific roles that define their activities in rela-
tion to other public and private organizations.
The following section briefly identifies the insights provided by the
existing literatures on global governance, regulation and whistleblowing,
before embarking upon the theoretical analysis of the emerging whistle-
blowing systems. The empirical analysis of whistleblowing with regard to
taxation more specifically is developed in the second half of the paper. It
will be concluded that whistleblowing in relation to global tax evasion is
mainly managed by private actors beyond the control of states and that
whistleblowing offers certain promises for regulating challenging activities
such as tax evasion.
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The literatures on global governance, regulation and whistleblowing
This section reviews the literatures relevant to the growth of whistleblowing
at the international level. It focuses first on the general character of the dif-
fusion of practices in contemporary global governance studies before turn-
ing to the literature on regulation that helps characterize whistleblowing as
a regulatory tool. The section concludes with the specific literature on
whistleblowing.
Insights from the literatures on global governance
In recent decades, there have been widely recognized changes in global gov-
ernance that provide the context to whistleblowing. Two types of changes are
particularly relevant here: the multiple forms of institutions that interact in glo-
bal governance and the multiple types of processes that are sources of glo-
bal rules.
First, a key feature in the debate on global governance is the emergence of
multiple forms of governance through state, market and civil society. Rather
than creating centralized bureaucratic capacity in formal intergovernmental
organizations, these new forms of governance mobilize diverse sets of actors
and institutions from across the world. This development has included the
emergence of private bodies that have the potential to govern as a complement
or alternative to traditional public policy, such as third-party certifications and
codes of conduct, critical civil society groups such as Transparency
International (TI) and business associations such as the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC), two organizations that have issued various whistleblow-
ing guidelines.2
While some sceptics argue that increased reliance on private mechanisms
by definition moves policy away from the public interest, this paper argues
that different procedures of participation, accountability and transparency can
enhance the publicness of private arrangements (Porter and Ronit 2010).
Decades ago it was recognized that governmental institutions can be captured
by private interests (Stigler 1971), and today certain private institutions, such
as media companies, can serve public functions, including in a global context.
It no longer makes sense to assume that governmental organizations are
always better at promoting the public interest than private organizations.
Criteria for assessing the degree of alignment of private standards with the
public interest are emerging,3 and can be used to assess the relationship
between whistleblowing and public interest.4
The second change in global governance is evident in the variety of proc-
esses that produce global rules. Some rules and norms are adopted at inter-
national levels and managed by international bodies. Treaties, for instance,
2 For the ICC, see <http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/areas-of-work/
corporate-responsibility-and-anti-corruption/whistleblowing/>. The role of TI is discussed
further below.
3 See for instance the ISEAL Alliance Codes of Good Practice (<http://www.isealalliance.
org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-practice>) and the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) 26000 standards on social responsibility (<http://www.iso.org/iso/
home/standards/iso26000.htm>), both of which are standards for private standards and practices.
4 On publicness, see Best and Gheciu (2011).
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remain important, as in the case of whistleblowing with the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention,5 and the United Nations’ (UN’s) own whistleblowing pro-
tections, adopted to govern its internal operations.6 There are also other ways
of making rules. Some rules may primarily be based in one or two countries
but nevertheless contribute to global governance because of their cross-border
influence and connections. National laws can also have extra-territorial effects,
for instance, when compliance with a particular jurisdiction’s laws by a multi-
national corporation requires adjustments in its operations outside that juris-
diction. Cross-border policy emulation, which can be encouraged by the above
mechanisms but also occurs without them, can contribute to the diffusion of
new governance practices as well. Scholars have begun to identify the condi-
tions under which such diffusion is likely (Simmons and Elkin 2004). In global
governance, the importance of the most powerful states in the globalization of
policies is well recognized. In particular, since World War II the US has pro-
jected its own practices beyond its borders, through governmental action or
through the practices of private actors such as business and civil society actors
(Simmons 2001; Levi-Faur 2005). In a comparative perspective, the develop-
ment of whistleblowing has been most advanced in the US, and US practices
have been held up as examples for other countries to emulate.
In sum, these governance changes over the last several decades provide the
wider context for the development and global dissemination of whistleblowing
as a new governance practice. While there is no world government, there are
multiple actors through which governance can be globalized when public and
private actors combine their efforts or when private actors take independent
action. Furthermore, such practices may be adopted at the global level or
adopted in one place and transferred to other parts of the world.
Insights from the literatures on regulation
Closely related to the changes in global governance are changes in global regu-
lation. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, these changes are import-
ant for the emergence of whistleblowing as a global regulatory instrument.
However, it is first necessary to understand how the different functions and
organizations can be connected vertically and horizontally to create effective
regulatory arrangements that do not necessarily need to be contained within a
single regulatory body. This connection is especially useful at the global level,
since the creation of integrated stand-alone regulatory bodies is typically
resisted by sovereign states.
An important feature in the literature on regulation is the vertical relation-
ship between different types of rules, driven in part by the challenge of
5 The full name is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. The text is at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf>. The Convention calls for ‘companies to provide channels for
communication by, and protection of, persons not willing to violate professional standards or
ethics under instructions or pressure from hierarchical superiors, as well as for persons willing to
report breaches of the law or professional standards or ethics occurring within the company in
good faith and on reasonable grounds, and should encourage companies to take appropriate
action based on such reporting’. Section XCv, 24–25.
6 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID¼16993#.WCdb__krLmY>. The current
policy can be found at <http://www.un.org/en/ethics/protections.html>.
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managing increasingly complex and technical problems. Three types of vertical
relationships are relevant: a coercion/voluntary relation, a public oversight/
private implementation relation and a global standard/national implementa-
tion relation, the first element in each of these three distinctions being associ-
ated with a larger scale or degree of authority. First, the relationship between
public and private regulation may take the form of a regulatory pyramid,
where most routine matters are handled privately and voluntarily by business,
but a number of more serious matters are escalated, and public regulators can
be brought in with coercive sanctions (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Midway
down this regulatory hierarchy, private actors create forms of self-regulation to
govern their own behaviour or to invite other private actors to join.7 Second,
private regulation may be usefully sensitive to the experiences and challenges
of the regulated business actors, and in a less costly and burdensome manner
than public regulation. However, private regulation may also provide opportu-
nities for private actors to abuse their unique familiarity with a given issue
area and manipulate the regulations or escape their obligation to comply. This
problem can be mitigated through formal or informal oversight by public
authorities, through the use of courts, regulatory supervision, legislative
review or the threat of stronger public regulation. Third, broad standards may
be set at the global level and then be implemented nationally with specific
public or private rules consistent with these broad global standards.
Horizontally, the creation of regulatory arrangements encompasses differ-
ent stages, which unfold over time. Typically, these include agenda-setting,
formulation, decision, implementation and evaluation stages which would be
organized around a state and its policy processes. The regulatory implementa-
tion stage, which is often the most challenging, can further be subdivided into
the following sequences: monitoring, compliance, adjudication and sanctioning
(Porter and Ronit 2015). It is useful to recognize these stages and sequences
because they identify linked functions that must be carried out for a policy or
regulatory process to be established. However, in today’s more complex and
globalized settings, as with the vertical relationships discussed above, these
functions and stages can increasingly be provided by different organizations,
some or all of which can be private (Porter and Ronit 2006; Abbott and Snidal
2009). For instance, standards may be formulated by one organization, compli-
ance may be monitored by another and sanctioning may involve a mix of mar-
ket pressures and threats from public authorities. At the global level, these
types of sanctioning can be more complex than conventional punishments at
the national level, and include, for instance, cross-border damage to a wrong-
doer’s reputation or brand. However, these types of sanctioning can also acti-
vate more conventional national penalties that would not have occurred
without the global institutions.
With regard to whistleblowing institutions it appears that both vertical and
horizontal interactions linking different actors in problem solving are involved.
Their regulatory significance would be easy to overlook if it were not recog-
nized that effective regulation does not require all the regulatory functions to
be contained within unified public organizations, but instead can be provided
7 Examples include the standards of the ISEAL Alliance, or the ISO 26000 standards for social
responsibility.
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by different public and private actors and institutions interacting along the
aforementioned vertical and horizontal dimensions.
Insights from the literatures on whistleblowing
The complexity of global governance and regulatory arrangements having
been addressed, this section now turns to the literature on whistleblowing to
identify the degree to which whistleblowing is becoming a recognizable and
institutionalized part of these complex arrangements.
The academic whistleblowing literature includes the fields of management
(how firms can manage whistleblowing policies or episodes); law (judicial
decisions or the design of legal protections); public administration (personal
motives and institutional conditions for whistleblowing); regulatory studies
(the levels and methods of monitoring and reporting); and political science
(appeals to politicians from employees) (Near and Miceli 2016; Walker 2015;
Cho and Song 2015; Etienne 2015; Ting 2008). Additionally, many reports and
policy or legal documents are produced by governmental, business and civil
society actors.
An important debate in the literature centres around the questions of how
to define whistleblowing and how to differentiate it from other types of infor-
mation disclosure, such as destructive hacking. A widely cited definition has
been provided by Near and Miceli (1985): ‘the disclosure by organisation mem-
bers (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the
control of their employees, to persons or organisations that may be able to
affect action’. This limits the understanding of whistleblowing in three ways:
the whistleblower must be a member of a defined organization; the targeted
practices must be under that organization’s control; and the information must
be directed to competent authorities. A key motivation for such restrictions is
to identify activities for which legal protections are most likely to attract sup-
port, and this approach has indeed been impressively successful in overcoming
earlier perceptions of the illegitimacy or immorality of whistleblowing and
putting legal protections in place in an increasing number of jurisdictions.
While acknowledging and valuing the merits of such a definition, it
appears that a more expansive definition is needed when analysing whistle-
blowing at the global level. The whistleblowing literature has already begun to
note the increasingly porous and complex character of contemporary firms
(Andrade 2015; Vandekerckhove 2006), which is majorly amplified at the glo-
bal level. Global supply chains, which account for an increasing share of cross-
border economic transactions, can involve many different tiers of suppliers of
different sizes linked through contracts and logistical arrangements that are
altered from year to year. A similarly networked character can be observed in
the global ‘tax industry’ and cases of tax evasion, as evident in the ‘global
wealth chains’ linking wealthy individuals and firms with offshore centres
identified by Seabrooke and Wigan (2017). These types of porous complex
organizations can be especially important targets for whistleblowing as a regu-
latory mechanism, since conventional authorities are likely to have more diffi-
culty detecting their potentially illegal activities than with those of well-
defined national firms. Moreover, at the global level there are likely no compe-
tent authorities comparable to those at the domestic level, and eliciting actions
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from multiple or foreign national authorities may be too complex for
whistleblowers.
Given this complexity and organizational porosity this paper proposes to
replace the definitional restrictions discussed above with other criteria for dif-
ferentiating between legitimate and illegitimate disclosures of information at
the global level. Although this may complicate the effort to strengthen legal
protections for whistleblowing in the short term, it is likely to greatly increase
the volume of cross-border wrongdoing that whistleblowers contribute to
deterring and sanctioning. Moreover, as shown in the case study of tax evasion
below, public authorities have been making effective use of information disclo-
sures that do not fit the conventional definition of whistleblowing but have
key properties that merit the whistleblowing label.
The proposed definition includes types of public-interested leaks and infor-
mation disclosures that may be initiated from outside the relevant firm, that
may target its clients, suppliers or stakeholders and that may be directed to
global media and other actors rather than competent legal authorities, with
sanctions working through reputational damage rather than legal penalties.
The definition is restricted by requiring the presence of a ‘legitimizing frame-
work’, discussed more fully below, to distinguish between disclosures that are
in the public interest and ones, such as destructive hacking, that are not. This
is similar to, but goes beyond, criteria such as ‘good faith and on reasonable
grounds’ which the G20 references in its best practices for whistleblowing.8
Therefore this paper defines whistleblowing as ‘a disclosure of confidential
information with the goal of contributing to exposing, deterring or punishing
activities that are widely perceived as illegitimate or illegal’.
An important vehicle for the international dissemination of whistleblowing
as a regulatory instrument is its links to anti-corruption campaigns.
International legal instruments that address whistleblower protections include
the UN Convention against Corruption, the 2009 OECD Recommendation of
the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Recommendation), the 1998
OECD Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in Public Service, the
Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, the
Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. As the G20 report on
this list notes, ‘such provisions have strengthened the international legal frame-
work for countries to establish effective whistleblower protection laws’.9
There are numerous ways that private actors and new technologies have
assisted in the globalization of whistleblowing as well. Whistleblowing NGOs
and networks, such as the Government Accountability Project, TI and the
International Whistleblowing Research Network, have promoted the emer-
gence of whistleblowing systems.
8 OECD, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Protection of Whistleblowers.’ Study on
Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding Principles for
Legislation. OECD, 2011. https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/48972967.pdf
9 OECD. ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Protection of Whistleblowers.’ Study on
Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding Principles for
Legislation. OECD 2011, 5.
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Taken together, this literature highlights how the elements of global gov-
ernance and regulation identified in the previous sections are also evident in
the growing presence of whistleblowing-related developments globally.
Whistleblowing rules have involved traditional treaties, more informal best
practices developed by the G20, a public body, and non-governmental actors
that operate globally or regionally.
Despite the valuable insights that the existing literatures have provided
into the concrete mechanisms of whistleblowing, their global dissemination
and how to assess their publicness, more work is needed to analyse the exist-
ing and potential contribution of whistleblowing to global governance
and regulation.
Conceptualizing whistleblowing as a global regulatory instrument
This section draws out how emerging whistleblowing systems use a mix of public
and private authority and the mechanisms that are invoked, including the issue
of how to know when whistleblowing is in the public interest. The notion of
‘system’ is used loosely here to refer to an emergent set of recognizable links
between actors and institutions, in contrast to the more tightly integrated and
operationally closed arrangements that are the focus of some systems theories.10
The organization of whistleblowing
The actors and their various properties and linkages can be considered a sys-
tem in emergence. Figure 1 illustrates a typical whistleblowing system and iden-
tifies specific tasks managed by the actors in the area of tax evasion. The four-
sided shape at the centre represents the ‘target’ organization from which the
information disclosed by the whistleblower originates.
As noted above, the whistleblower may be an employee of the organization
or a related entity, but the organization’s information may also be disclosed by
an external hack. Many organizations have internal processes for managing
complaints, which may encourage potential whistleblowers to seek resolution
of their concerns within the target organization itself. Arrayed around the tar-
get organization are the various bodies that interact in the system of whistle-
blowing. This view is consistent with the new forms of governance discussed
in the previous section, which can involve a variety of changing actors and
rules. For instance, civil society organizations and business associations may
promote or oppose whistleblowing. Media and journalists may publicize the
information disclosed by the whistleblower and put pressure on the target
organization. Public rule-makers may create rules protecting whistleblowers or
rules that criminalize the conduct of the target organization that troubled the
whistleblower. Courts and law enforcement may act on violations of the law
which the whistleblower reveals. The organizations helping whistleblowers
can include ones, such as WikiLeaks or the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists, that help disseminate the disclosed information, or
10 These arrangements could also more precisely be described as ‘assemblages’ or ‘ecologies’,
but for our purposes here the more widely used ‘system’ label is sufficient.
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ones that support whistleblowing, such as the Government
Accountability Project.
The different organizations displayed in Figure 1 and the individuals
associated with them have varying convergent and competing incentives to
engage in the process of whistleblowing. A desire to contribute to the public
interest and to act ethically should not be underestimated: often whistle-
blowing takes great personal courage given the risks. NGOs such as TI may
support whistleblowers because the latter’s disclosures help advance the
NGOs’ larger mission. News media benefit commercially from the types of
stories that whistleblowers reveal, tempered by professional standards that
govern journalists and safeguard their credibility. Public authorities may
use information disclosed by whistleblowers which would have been diffi-
cult to obtain otherwise.
Figure 1. A whistleblowing system.
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The emerging system lacks clear coordination mechanisms, and different
ambitions and interest may conflict. Whistleblowers may have quite personal
motives that stimulate certain actions and may not necessarily bring full and
unbiased information through leaks. NGOs have different motives to engage
in tax issues and while some direct attention to development and failed-state
conditions others concentrate on the continuing funding of welfare states.
News media are involved in strong competition at domestic and international
levels and primarily launch campaigns in areas that are of interest to their
readership but may avoid issues that are technically highly complicated but
helpful to other actors in the system. Relying on and purchasing information
from a host of unknown sources, states may act spontaneously and not build
up the needed capacity to boost the role of governments in combating tax eva-
sion and even hinder intergovernmental initiatives.
In spite of the different agendas pursued by these various actors and insti-
tutions, the sum of the latter’s often disparate efforts can contribute to the pro-
gressive strengthening of the systemic properties of whistleblowing even in
the absence of overall coordination. The functions discussed in the previous
section11 enable both the emergence and ongoing operation of whistleblowing.
For instance, a civil society organization such as TI may engage in agenda-set-
ting to try to strengthen protections for whistleblowers, which will further
institutionalize whistleblowing. Similarly, public rule-makers, such as legisla-
tors or regulators, may create incentives or protections for whistleblowers,
which may both strengthen the overall principles and mechanisms of whistle-
blowing and encourage and manage particular acts of whistleblowing.
Consistent with the literatures on global governance, a mix of public and pri-
vate organizations also involves a mix of global and national ones.
The vertical aspect of regulatory arrangements is evident in the steps that
any particular act of whistleblowing involves. These measures can include a
variety of public and private elements. The great majority of whistleblowers
start by raising their concerns within the organization that employs them. If
the whistleblower’s employer fails to address the whistleblower’s concerns
there is the possibility that he or she will go outside the organization, to the
media or government (Near and Miceli 2016). Ethically driven hackers may
also begin by disclosing information publicly. Whistleblowing then follows a
‘tiered approach’ that is somewhat similar to ‘responsive regulation’ in regula-
tion theory, where more severe compliance mechanisms are only activated
after more voluntary ones fail (Andrade 2015; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).
Whistleblowing in complex global settings: norms and legitimacy
As noted above, it is important to expand the definition of whistleblowing in a
global context, where organizations are often more complex and porous and
competent authorities are not always easily identified or accessed by whistle-
blowers. The types of actors that can be considered whistleblowers need to be
broadened to include ethical hackers and leakers, although their relations with
the concrete organizations are qualitatively different from traditional
11 Similar types of bringing together of functions in the sequences involved in the
implementation of self-regulation have been identified by Porter and Ronit (2015).
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whistleblowers’. Similarly, because there may not be an easily identified or
accessed competent authority, various intended recipients of the disclosed
information need to be taken into account. At the global level, the pathways
between a disclosure of information and its ultimate positive effects with
regard to deterring or punishing wrongdoing may be complex and varied. For
instance, media reports may generate public outrage, consequently leading a
national authority to take action, which then contributes to a change in global
norms or an increase in reputational risk, eventually inspiring a multinational
firm to crack down on its employees’ wrongdoing.
Simultaneously, it is very important to be able to distinguish legitimate
information disclosures from ones that are destructive or predominantly moti-
vated by private gain or adventure, in order not only to prevent harmful infor-
mation disclosures, but also to retain the legitimacy that whistleblowing has
obtained by restricting the range of activities to which this label is applied.
Mixed motives may be involved. The information disclosure may be motivated
by private interests, such as getting undeserved revenge on an employer, get-
ting a qui tam payment (based on a share of the recovered assets or monies),
gaining fame or assisting the employer’s competitor or opponent (Broderick
2007). On the one hand, the ability to discuss certain issues inside an organiza-
tion, without the fear that they will be circulated publicly can be in the public
interest, since confidentiality can facilitate decision-making and is vital to the
trust that sustains social collectivities. On the other hand, governments and
firms can seek to conceal information in ways that are contrary to the public
interest, including fraud and other legal violations, and in such cases whistle-
blowing is an appropriate and valuable remedy.
Therefore, we need criteria other than whether a governance instrument or
action is governmental or non-governmental to assess whether it is in the pub-
lic interest or not (Best and Gheciu 2011). Governmental processes can often be
captured by private interests, and private actors and institutions can produce
public goods. The publicness of a process or an act then depends on the pres-
ence or absence of certain properties associated with it, rather than whether it
is initiated by governmental or non-governmental actors, and participation,
accountability and transparency can serve as useful starting points.12
Discerning the public interest in whistleblowing: a legitimizing framework
It is particularly important to focus on the framework within which legitimate
whistleblowing acts take place. This allows varied types of actors with varied
types of interests to be included, shifting the criterion for the legitimacy of the
information disclosure from the types of actor, motivation and target, to an
evaluation of the institutional process and its alignment with global norms.
This paper refers to this institutional process as the ‘legitimizing framework’.
This framework could include the involvement of public authorities in the
assessment of the whistleblower’s information, which can lend legitimacy to
the process if the public authorities are independent of the organization on
12 These three criteria are widely used, sometimes with different labels. These criteria were
applied by Porter and Ronit (2010). The criteria highlight a process approach to the public interest,
rather than an outcomes approach. For a similar approach see Mattli and Woods (2009).
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Table 1. Major whistleblowing leaks in tax evasion
Year Leak Nature of leak Impact
2008 Kieber  Account information from
5800 clients of Liechtenstein
Bank, collecting e4 million
from German authorities.
 Client tax evasion altered
Liechtenstein Bank
secrecy rules.
2008 Elmer  Offshore bank account of
2000 ‘high net worth
individuals’ and
corporations.
 Julius Baer’s role in alleged
tax evasion in
the Cayman Islands.
 No action from Swiss
courts.
 Elmer tried for violating
Swiss banking secrecy law.
2009 Birkenfield  Recovery of US$780 million
and names.
 US$5.5 billion collected
from IRS Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure
Program from fear of
the leak.
 Closure of Swiss banking
programmes.
 Winding down of Swiss
bank secrecy.
2013 Offshore
Leaks
 Data from cache of 2.5
million leaked offshore files
obtained by ICIJ.
 Records detail 30,000
offshore holdings of people
and companies in more
than 170 countries and
territories.
 Amplified political will of
EU Commission to tackle
tax evasion.
 Searchable database created
by ICIJ.
 High-profile resignations.
2014 Luxembourg
Leaks
 Secret deals between global
corporations and
Luxembourg tax authorities
exempting corporations
from paying tax in other
EU countries.
 Embarrassment to local
government and
corporations.
 Crisis for Luxembourg and
European cooperation.
 Real threat of prosecution
to whistleblowers.
2015 Swiss
Leaks
 Identified private accounts
with Swiss branch of HBSC.
 Revealed how arrangements
were made to avoid
paying tax.
 Huge pressure on bank and
Swiss authorities.
 Shows tax evasion involves
several parties.
2015 Football
Leaks
 Players, agents,
intermediaries and clubs
involved in financial
transactions to avoid or
reduce paying tax.
 Manipulation or violation of
tax laws and rules of
Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA).
 Traditional public
regulation is inadequate to
regulate and monitor the
industry.
 Reputation damage to
players, clubs, etc.
 EIC created to disseminate
information and
protect sources.
2016 Panama
Papers
 Wealthy individuals in
business and government
try to evade paying tax.
ICIJ plays especially
prominent role/
 Weaknesses in monitoring
and sanctioning of tax
evasion, and enabling role
of law firms.
(Continued)
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which the whistle has been blown. Alternatively, the legitimizing framework
could involve norms or standards that specify how to assess the integrity and
fairness of the whistleblowing act and its effects. As noted in the previous sec-
tion, these types of rules about private governance initiatives have developed
in other areas of global governance.13 These frameworks assist with account-
ability. Elements of a legitimizing framework can include: whether it is gov-
erned or shaped in some manner by widely agreed norms and standards even
if there is not universal consensus on them; whether there is a stated public
interest in the disclosure or a hack is motivated by the hacker’s desire for
notoriety; and whether the different bodies organizing whistleblowing have
the capacity to assess whether the whistleblower met the ‘good faith’ standard
that is becoming a common requirement in whistleblowing.
As will become evident in final section of this paper, the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and their handling of the
Panama and Paradise Papers matched the criteria for public interest whistle-
blowing much better than key disclosures on Wikileaks. The ICIJ is a private
organization, but it is governed by journalistic and ethical standards in a way
that WikiLeaks is not. Additionally, public authorities have increasingly dis-
played a willingness to make use of information that has been disclosed by
informants, leakers or hackers that previously would have fallen outside more
restrictive definitions of whistleblowing. The disclosed information has been
integrated into more conventional legal, policy, regulatory or enforcement
processes, thereby confirming the information’s legitimacy.
In the future, it will be important to continue to strengthen and make more
explicit the public-interest norms that separate ethical and beneficial whistle-
blowing from destructive information disclosures. As in global governance
more generally, this norm-creation process will likely involve an interacting
mix of initiatives from national governments, possibly acting extraterritorially;
NGOs like TI; global public institutions such as the G20 and OECD,
Year Leak Nature of leak Impact
2017 Paradise
Papers
 Seven million records from
offshore law firm Appleby,
from 1950 to 2016,
connected to people in 180
countries.
 Instances of tax evasion
embarrassing to
global elites.
 New data incorporated into
searchable database.
 Investigations, arrest
warrants and strengthening
of tax compliance.
2018 West Africa
Leaks
 Collaboration between ICIJ,
West African Norbert
Zongo Cell for Investigative
Journalism (Cenozo) and
reporters from 11 countries,
drawing on existing
ICIJ data.
 Exposed secret accounts
and tax evasion of powerful
political and corporate
actors in West Africa.
13 Thomas Franck has pointed to such ‘second order’ rules as important in the legitimacy of
international law (Franck 1990).
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professional associations, and business actors such as the ICC. Such evolving
norms should not undermine the legitimacy that whistleblowing has already
achieved by restricting the range of actors to which the ‘whistleblowing’ label
has been applied. More restrictive criteria can still be drawn upon in assessing
the public-interestedness of any particular disclosure in more conventional
cases of whistleblowing. However, the development of a ‘legitimizing frame-
work’ could extend the benefits of whistleblowing to the more dynamic yet
less conventional global settings.
Experiences with whistleblowing: the case of global tax evasion
At the global level, the emergence of a whistleblowing system for tax evasion
appears to display the characteristics set out in the first section of this paper.
These characteristics include the interaction of multiple types of actors reflect-
ing different regulatory functions. Whistleblowing in taxation is underdevel-
oped compared with the closely related areas of corruption and financial
fraud. These differences are evident in the US, where whistleblowing has been
most institutionalized and has inspired global initiatives. Nevertheless, the
increasing number and scale of tax-related cases, as well as the institutionaliza-
tion of the global mechanisms for managing these, indicate the gradual estab-
lishment of a whistleblowing system for tax evasion. The emergence of a
‘legitimizing framework’ is also demonstrated by the role played by the ICIJ,
which, in contrast to Wikileaks, has developed clear ethical guidelines that
help identify the public interest in information provided by whistleblowers
and leakers. Public authorities have further legitimized unconventional infor-
mation disclosures, which might previously not have fitted conceptions of
whistleblowing, by soliciting, using or responding to this information.
Globally, a key development was the 2008 payment by German authorities of
e4.2 million to Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of a Liechtenstein bank, for
stolen bank data on approximately 600 tax evaders. More recently, Danish tax
authorities negotiated and bought information from the Panama Papers
through an unknown source to hunt down Danish tax evaders (Harding 2016).
Additional examples of the increasing use by tax authorities of information
from whistleblowing or leaks are provided below.
Table 1 lists the ten main whistleblowing cases relevant to global taxation.
While space considerations preclude discussing these in detail, it is important
to note the number of consequential cases and the significant effects they have
had. The cases are listed in chronological order by the year of the disclosure of
the information. While a full discussion of each case goes beyond the scope of
this article, we do analyse the ways in which each of the first three cases sig-
nals the emergence of a whistleblowing system for global tax issues, and
briefly address the significance of the remaining seven cases.
The first case was significant because of the payment Heinrich Kieber
received from the German authorities. There were various effects as authorities
in other countries, including the US, used the data (Sexton 2008). This case tes-
tifies to a heightened level of acceptance of this type of whistleblowing by
public authorities, although it provoked sharp conflict between Germany and
Liechtenstein, and debate within Germany (Spiegel staff 2008). Kieber became
an international fugitive with a new identity provided by the German
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government. This controversy indicates only the beginning of a whistleblowing
system that lacked a legitimizing framework at the time.
In the second case in Table 1, Rudolf Elmer, who had been chief operating
officer of Julius Baer bank’s Caribbean offices, actively sought to publicize,
without compensation, evidence of tax evasion, contacting public authorities
and Wikileaks. In the following years, Elmer was imprisoned for 200 days, but
the Zurich high court rejected efforts to prosecute him for breaking Swiss
secrecy laws, and he has been applauded as a whistleblower by the Tax Justice
Network (Fowler 2017). This indicates a further institutionalization of the tax-
ation whistleblowing system.
The third case is one of the most successful ones. It involves the US
Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) use of information acquired from Bradley
Birkenfeld, a former employee of the Swiss bank UBS. Birkenfeld served 2.5
years in jail for his own role in the tax evasion scheme. However, in 2012
Birkenfeld received US$104 million from the IRS as a reward for his informa-
tion (Hilzenrath 2009).14 The many effects of his information included recovery
of US$780 million and the communication of thousands of names. Worry about
figuring among the disclosed contributed to more than US$5.5 billion being
collected through the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (Ventry
2014). Additional impacts included the closure of Swiss banking programs and
the winding down of Swiss bank secrecy. In 2016, Birkenfeld’s information
was used by French authorities against French tax evaders (Binetti 2016).15 The
scale of the effects in this case indicates a further strengthening of the whistle-
blowing system.
The remaining seven cases illustrate the increasing prominence since 2013
of two consortia of journalists, the ICIJ and European Investigative
Collaborations (EIC). As discussed in more detail below, the ICIJ and EIC have
begun to establish a legitimizing framework for the whistleblowing cases they
have worked with, by developing and applying standards that pertain to the
ethics of the information disclosures, including whether they are in the public
interest, how they can be organized to be most effective for this public interest,
whether the information is reliable and whether rights to privacy are consid-
ered. Consistent with the types of interactions illustrated in the conceptual sec-
tion above, Table 1 also displays the interactions of specialized bodies, such as
Wikileaks or the ICIJ, with public authorities, tax ministries and courts, civil
society and other actors. Overall, then, Table 1 displays the emergence and
progressive strengthening of a global tax whistleblowing system over the
past decade.
Beyond the individual cases, and at the broadest global public level, are the
treaties and the G20 principles discussed previously. However, these primarily
operate in the background to legitimize the idea of tax whistleblowing. An
important organization that advocates for the strengthening of a global whis-
tleblowing system to address tax evasion specifically is TI, established in 1993
with a focus on combating corruption. Tax evasion is closely associated with
14 Also see <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/whistleblowing-reward-
united-states-pays-65m-to-former-convict-and-swiss-banker-28791431.html>.
15 See <http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/articles/tax-whistleblowers/>, a rich source of
information on tax whistleblowing.
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corruption because corruption involves spending and receiving money that are
hidden from the tax authorities inside as well as across national borders. TI
has documented the problems associated with tax evasion in different coun-
tries around the world, and it has organized various meetings and made pro-
posals to rectify legislation (TI 2015). The organization is heavily involved in
formulating whistleblower policies for states to implement in the belief that
governments are ultimately responsible for defending the rights of their citi-
zens.16 However, another private actor, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) main-
tains that TI is too concerned with corruption in developing countries, which
admittedly exists, and less focused on the offshore financial institutions.17
Nevertheless, the efforts of TI and the TJN are complementary in strengthening
of the norms that legitimize whistleblowing in the area of tax evasion.
One of the most important developments in the whistleblowing system is
the prominent and growing role of the ICIJ, and its displacement of
WikiLeaks, which is the focus of the next section.
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
A decade ago, WikiLeaks might have appeared to be the key private organiza-
tion facilitating tax-related whistleblowing at the global level. However, it now
appears that it has played a relatively peripheral role, and the lead has been
taken by the ICIJ. Arguably, the legitimizing framework provided by the ICIJ
is a key reason for this change, and an indicator of the gradual institutionaliza-
tion of the whistleblowing system for global tax issues.
WikiLeaks, launched in 2006 by Julian Assange, became especially promin-
ent in 2010 with its release of over 250,000 sensitive and confidential US
embassy cables. In that release Assange made the documents available to five
news organizations, which in turn promised to protect individuals by redact-
ing identities and exercising discretion about what information should be
released (Leigh 2010). However, in subsequent years, WikiLeaks gradually
abandoned this cautious approach and was criticized for releasing critical per-
sonal information.
As noted above, Elmer, a former employee of the bank Julius Baer, pro-
vided data on 2000 accounts to Julian Assange in 2011 (Lynn 2011; Seamark
2011). Although Wikileaks publicized this leak, the organization has not been a
major vehicle for tax whistleblowers since.18 Following the Panama Papers
leak, WikiLeaks even attacked the ICIJ, for instance, with a tweet stating,
‘Washington DC based Ford, Soros funded soft-power tax-dodge “ICIJ” has a
WikiLeaks problem.’19 In part, the dispute was fuelled by different visions of
how information should be managed and shows how new organizations and
16 <https://www.transparency.org/files/content/activity/2009_PrinciplesForWhistleblowing
Legislation_EN.pdf>.
17 See, for instance, the TJN’s evaluation of corruption: <http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/
inequality-democracy/corruption/>.
18 The WikiLeaks information on this leak is at <https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Bank_Julius_
Baer>. The absence of other major tax information on WikiLeaks can be confirmed by scanning its
list of leaks (<https://wikileaks.org/-Leaks-.html>) and by Google searching ‘WikiLeak’ and ‘tax’,
which primarily returns information on the Julius Baer leak.
19 <https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/717454569861611520>.
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emergent properties of whistleblowing adapt when carving out their different
roles. While the specific motivations of the individuals who initiated the Swiss,
Luxembourg, Panama, Offshore and Paradise leaks are unknown, it is likely
that the leaks were directed to the ICIJ instead of WikiLeaks because of the
greater prudence and credibility of the former, as well as the greater special-
ization of the ICIJ on tax evasion issues.
ICIJ identifies itself as ‘a global network of more than 200 investigative
journalists in 70 countries … focusing on issues that do not stop at national
frontiers: cross-border crime, corruption, and the accountability of power’.20 It
was formed in 1997 as a branch of the Center for Public Integrity, which has
received funding from the Soros Foundation. In February 2017, it became an
independent news organization and, in July 2017, it was granted non-profit
status by US tax authorities. It has a well-defined, conventional and transpar-
ent governance structure, with a Board of Directors, an Advisory Committee
composed of experienced investigative journalists and a Network Committee,
‘a working body of ICIJ members who represent the ICIJ members, setting
principles and best practices, priorities and activities, liaising with the board
and giving advice to the ICIJ Executive on adding or excusing members.21 All
the names of the members of these committees are posted on the ICIJ website,
with descriptions of their experience.
ICIJ mobilizes conventional journalistic and professional mechanisms to fos-
ter trust and credibility and contributes to the type of legitimizing framework
discussed above. It seeks to position its work within the traditions of journal-
ism, and, as such, it is a member of the Global Investigative Journalism
Network (GIJN).22 The ICIJ displays certain features typical of a professional
knowledge organization, such as professional standards, and in some respects
also functions as a kind of think-tank. Yet, at the same time, an integral part of
its strategy is close cooperation with international media in order to influence
agenda-setting at the domestic and international levels. Therefore it employs a
range of tools similar to those employed by social movements.
The activities of the ICIJ rest on various rules of self-regulation, which the
organization has defined for itself. The ICIJ refers to the Code of Ethics of the
Society of Professional Journalists, and to additional principles defined by the
Center for Public Integrity for the Center and for the Consortium.23 It also
mentions principles on its website in relation to its general work and in rela-
tion to concrete projects. For instance, it notes, ‘We are an investigative jour-
nalism organization and, as such, we report stories that are in the public
interest … parts of the data are of a private nature and of no interest to the
public. The ICIJ will not release personal data en masse’ (Guevara 2016). The
ICIJ is committed to not turning over documents to governments.
The specific rules of the ICIJ also seek to provide whistleblowers with a
maximum degree of anonymity. The ICIJ has developed detailed advice and
20 <https://www.icij.org/about/>.
21 <https://www.icij.org/about/>.
22 The GIJN has many other links. #CumExFiles, a project of Correctiv, another GIJN-related
organization, based in Germany, has brought together journalists from 12 European countries to
reveal, again on the basis of whistleblowing, how several European countries have been exposed
to tax fraud. On Correctiv, see <https://correctiv.org/ueber-uns/>.
23 <https://www.publicintegrity.org/about/our-work/editorial-policies>.
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security mechanisms such as its encrypted SecureDrop server and the use of a
Tor browser to protect whistleblowers in the early stages where contacts are
being made between whistleblowers and the organization.24 The security
mechanisms show that the ICIJ’s self-regulation covers more than the princi-
ples guiding the work of the journalists and embraces logistical support for
whistleblowing. Furthermore, the ICIJ has expanded its capacity for directly
disseminating the information it provides, including its searchable database
with more than 520,000 entities from four different leaks and its use of
social media.
Joining the ICIJ is voluntary but the ICIJ has established admission criteria
and encourages applications. As the ICIJ notes: ‘we sometimes work with jour-
nalists and media organizations in countries where we haven’t done work
before. We vet those new partners thoroughly’ (Guevara 2016). Joining implies
that members must respect the code as an integral part of the organization.
These compliance rules echo a pattern found in many professional associations
where members must observe codes of self-regulation.
While the impacts of the information disseminated by the ICIJ are ongoing
and not fully measurable, it is clear that they are having serious consequences.
The ICIJ’s activities have had significance for the firms, governments and indi-
viduals they have exposed, as well as for public authorities’ tax-related policies
and investigations. As of 2017, there were at least 150 investigations going on
in 79 countries in response to the Panama Papers.25 Other examples of impacts
include the pressure the Luxembourg Leaks put on Jean-Claude Juncker when
he became head of the European Commission and promised to reform tax pol-
icy, after 19 years as Luxembourg’s prime minister (Boland-Rudder 2014). In
the wake of the Panama Papers former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif
was disqualified from the premiership by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and
then he, his daughter and his son-in-law were indicted in 2017 by an anti-cor-
ruption court (Hamilton 2017). Australia’s Tax Commissioner has written to
other countries to propose joint action in response to data on tax issues made
public by the ICIJ (Chenoweth 2014). In March 2018, the chair of a British par-
liamentary subcommittee cited the Paradise Papers in commenting on the com-
mittee’s launch of an investigation of tax evasion (Bowers 2018). These
examples confirm the types of interactions characteristic of whistleblowing sys-
tems as set out in the conceptual section above, as well as the effectiveness of
whistleblowing in contributing to deterring or punishing wrongdoing.
Specialization in global whistleblowing: EIC and ‘Football Leaks’
This section briefly discusses the case of ‘Football Leaks’, which was primarily
managed by EIC rather than the ICIJ, but otherwise is very similar to the ICIJ
cases. The emergence of new and specialized initiatives indicates a differenti-
ation and regional specialization within the emerging global whistleblowing
system for tax issues, as well as further confirming the decentralized but effect-
ive character that whistleblowing systems have at the global level.
24 <https://www.icij.org/leak/>.
25 <http://www.journalismfestival.com/pressreleases-2017/football-leaks-and-panama-
papers-two-tales-of-great-journalism/>.
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Starting in December 2016 under a new platform called ‘Football Leaks’, a
significant number of documents, totalling 1.9 terabytes, has been released.
This was, in fact, the biggest leak ever in the world of sport.26 The documents,
including contracts and agreements, show how both a large number of profes-
sional football players, various agents and intermediaries as well as football
clubs have been involved in different kinds of financial transactions to avoid
tax by manipulating or violating existing tax laws. The Football Leaks platform
itself was created by a secret group of whistleblowers, whose spokesperson,
‘John’, has managed to conceal his identity so far (Buschmann and Wulzinger
2016; Gordon 2015).
The organization behind Football Leaks is the EIC, which was formed in 2016
by media organizations in nine European countries specializing in investigative
journalism, and led by Der Spiegel from Germany.27 EIC covers a variety of issues
other than taxation, current projects including one on the International Criminal
Court and one on the flow of weapons, in addition to Football Leaks and a pro-
ject on Malta’s role in tax evasion.28 Only one member (medium) per country is
admitted, thereby guaranteeing the partners’ and funders’ exclusive commercial
rights to the material and to the publication of results. EIC pools resources in joint
investigation and dissemination of results and evaluation of documents provided
by whistleblowers and other sources. Therefore, investigations not only accumu-
late material from various informants, including anonymous sources, but also
encourage whistleblowing activity. As argued by EIC, this form of cooperation
should be viewed in a broader institutional context: ‘Due to their structure and
methodology, collaborative networks are one of the few mechanisms able to keep
up with the globalized power structures (i.e. governments, corporations), thus
becoming the only way forward for investigative journalism.’29 The governing
principles of EIC focus more on the goal of constructing the network than on pro-
tecting whistleblowers or journalistic integrity, and the governance structure is
not well defined, and thus EIC’s self-regulatory capacity is less developed than
the ICIJ’s. For Football Leaks, EIC worked with 12 European media organizations
and over 60 journalists reporting in 13 languages. It had to grapple with legal
injunctions in some of its members’ countries, as well as logistical issues such as
the timing of publications. Overall, its capacity for collaboration was enhanced by
its management of the Football Leaks information.30
Overall the case of EIC and Football Leaks follows a similar pattern to the ICIJ
and its work, albeit in a less rigorous and robust way. It shows how whistleblow-
ing systems emerge globally and become institutionalized in the area of tax eva-
sion. The regional specialization of EIC is an indicator of the overall maturation
of the global whistleblowing system for taxation and shows that this new global
regulatory instrument is not only associated with US actors, even if historically
the US has made the most use of whistleblowing in its public policies.
26 <https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com/>.
27 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/der-spiegel-and-eight-other-media-found-
investigative-network-a-1084054.html>.
28 <https://eic.network/#projects>.
29 <https://eic.network/>.
30 <http://www.journalismfestival.com/pressreleases-2017/football-leaks-and-panama-
papers-two-tales-of-great-journalism/>.
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The effectiveness of whistleblowing in regulating global tax evasion
The global tax-related cases of whistleblowing examined in this section confirm
the conceptual discussion of emergent whistleblowing systems in the previous
section. The amount and significance of disclosed information has been
increasing over time. It has been facilitated by the roles played by an increas-
ingly varied mix of actors and institutions, as the many individual cases dis-
play, including, for instance, the general norm-setting role of TI, the
assessment and publicizing roles of the ICIJ and EIC, and enforcement through
both the reputational and legal consequences of the whistleblowing. While
these actors and institutions are varied, they are not random but rather display
the roles and relationships set out in the model of emergent whistleblowing
system. Multiple motivations and incentives are evident, including the desire
of the ICIJ to find a sustainable business model for cross-border investigative
journalism, the desire of public authorities to use new methods to find and
punish tax evaders and the desire of TI to extend its campaign on corruption
into the area of taxation. Public moral outrage at tax evasion is also evident.
The growing acceptance and use of information disclosed by the different
cases of whistleblowing, and the norms governing the processing of informa-
tion by the ICIJ have contributed to the emergence of a ‘legitimizing frame-
work’ that distinguishes public-interested whistleblowing from harmful
information disclosures. The effectiveness of these arrangements is evident in
the very large sums of money that have been recovered, as well as the damage
to the reputations of those who have engaged in illicit activities relating to
tax evasion.
It is unlikely that all the tax-related cases of whistleblowing discussed
above would have occurred or had the impact they did in the absence of the
emerging system highlighted in this paper. In earlier cases, especially Kieber
and Birkenfield, the encouragement or acceptance of the information about
global tax evasion by German and US authorities, and their willingness to pro-
vide a monetary reward, involved a shift in the acceptability and legitimacy of
this type of whistleblowing. In the cases managed by the ICIJ or EIC the cred-
ibility, organization and impact of the disclosed information was vastly ampli-
fied by the coordinated efforts of the journalists involved. Had all the raw data
simply been recklessly posted on WikiLeaks with no care taken to evaluate the
veracity, or the public interest in disclosing private information, then it is less
likely that the general public or public officials or single journalists would
have taken them as seriously. The efforts of public authorities to identify and
punish the leaker would have also potentially been stronger than their efforts
to punish the tax evaders.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that whistleblowing, rather than being a series of indi-
vidual acts, is an emergent and increasingly institutionalized regulatory instru-
ment that is disseminating and strengthening globally. The global spread of
whistleblowing as a regulatory instrument is evident in the growing consensus
in the G20 and other international bodies about best practices on whistleblow-
ing, as well as the introduction of whistleblowing protection in an increasing
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number and variety of countries. The paper has developed the concept of an
‘emerging whistleblowing system’, identified its major features and analysed
how these features reflect current trends in global governance and regulation.
These systemic properties include a mix of public and private actors and insti-
tutions, which interact vertically and horizontally. Vertically, private organiza-
tions, including firms, which are closer to the whistleblower, may have
voluntary procedures governing whistleblowing, formal law and coercive sanc-
tions being provided by public institutions. Horizontally, the different func-
tions, stages and sequences involved in establishing and sustaining the
organizations involved in whistleblowing come together in a disaggregated
manner. As in global governance and regulation more generally, the emergent
and complex character of these forms of organization can often obscure their
capacities and effectiveness when interacting.
As with similar types of global governance and regulation, especially those
with significant presence of private rules, whistleblowing can be controversial.
The concept of a ‘legitimizing framework’ helps assess the public-interested-
ness of a whistleblowing system.
The second part of the paper applied the concept of an emerging whistleblow-
ing system and a legitimizing framework to the case of global tax evasion. It
focused on the role played by the ICIJ and how the latter has displaced
WikiLeaks in the area of taxation. The large volume of information that the ICIJ
has processed and published, interacting with public, business and other non-gov-
ernmental actors, continues to have important effects around the world. The ICIJ
itself has grown in its significance and capacity, and in Europe a similar institu-
tion has emerged with EIC and its processing of Football Leaks.
Overall, global tax evasion is a complex issue to govern. However, certain
advances have been made. A whistleblowing system has emerged as an
increasingly institutionalized instrument to combat global tax evasion. While
this system involves private actors, especially the ICIJ, it also has mechanisms
to evaluate the public interest in whistleblowing, and to mobilize effective
sanctions, as national public authorities respond to the information made pub-
lic. More work is needed by researchers and practitioners to understand the
organizations involved and to define a more explicit and specific legitimizing
framework. Public authorities in the G20 and OECD and at the national level
should continue to encourage whistleblowing as an instrument for regulating
global problems such as tax evasion, while continuing to refine agreed global
norms associated with it, such as when it is legitimate to offer monetary
rewards to whistleblowers. Public authorities should also actively pursue leads
provided through the work of the ICIJ and EIC. By making the regulatory
potential of whistleblowing systems more visible, this paper contributes to
their further development and strengthening, to address not just tax evasion,
but also other global problems characterized by governance deficits.
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